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Comparative Law and State-Building:
The "Organic Minimalist" Approach to
Legal Reconstruction
DAN E. STIGALL*
Comparative law is an 'ecole de vrit' which extends and
enriches the supply of solutions and offers the scholar of critical
capacity the opportunity of finding the 'better solution' for his
time and place.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Jean Brissaud, a legal historian, compared society to a
biological organism when discussing the legal history of his native
France.2 Similarly, legal systems are like living beings. Legal
systems possess specific, individualized organs, each of which
serves its own function and upon which the whole relies in order to
live and survive.3 In that regard, legal reconstruction of weakened
states, an integral part of modern state-building, is like major
surgery. Only by studying the unique characteristics of the
organism upon which one operates can one properly make
decisions and avert catastrophe. In law, as in biology, organisms
and institutions quickly reject unnatural transplants. Therefore,
the study of comparative law is critical for proper decision-making
in state-building. Only when international actors consider policies
* Dan E. Stigall is a United States Army Judge Advocate (JAG). He received his J.D. in
2000 from the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University and is a member
of the Louisiana State Bar. Any opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and not necessarily the United States Department of Defense.
1. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 15 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford University Press 3d rev. ed. 1998) (1977).
2. See JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PUBLIC LAW 3-5 (James W.
Garner trans., Beard Books 2001) (1915). But see B.C. SMITH, UNDERSTANDING THIRD
WORLD POLITICS: THEORIES OF POLITICAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 71 (2d. ed.
2003) (expressing distaste for biological analogies).
3. See BRISSAUD, supra note 2, at 3.
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from a comparative legal perspective, can they effectively
rehabilitate weakened states in a manner that is both meaningful
and lasting.
This article examines various approaches to the legal
reconstruction of weakened or failed governments. Critical to this
survey is an understanding of prevalent legal paradigms that will
confront international actors engaged in state-building. Ultimately,
this article advocates an "organic minimalist" approach to legal
reconstruction- an approach ' aimed at efficiently focusing
resources in a way that empowers the organic legal system of the
target nation without undermining the legitimacy of the judiciary
and other government institutions.4
II. BACKGROUND
During the Cold War, world powers began to see former
colonies and newly independent nations as sources of competition.5
By assisting these fledgling nations, the United States and the
Soviet Union sought to establish strategic footholds in various
areas of the world and gain greater influence in the developing
world through a strategy of outbidding, outspending, and peer
displacement.6 The idea of assisting and developing weakened
states was one aspect of a broader foreign policy aimed at
achieving international dominance and eliminating a peer
competitor. With the onset of Vietnam, world powers realized that
the task of assisting and developing states was critical to providing
security in post-conflict settings.7 However, the political and social
4. This approach shares many of the same ideals as the "cultural" approach to
development. See HOWARD J. WIARDA, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING
NATIONS: IS THERE STILL A THIRD WORLD?, at 52 (David Tatom ed., 2004):
The cultural approach, of course, favored development but argued that scholars
and policymakers needed to pay far more attention to the distinct cultures and
histories of the non-Western countries and areas involved.... Each country or
culture filtered development through its own culturally derived values,
institutions, and ways of doing things, accepting some practices and institutions
from the West but always doing things their own way. Or else they worked out
fusions and blends of imported and local or indigenous ways and institutions.
Id.
5. See David Ekbladh, From Consensus to Crisis: The Postwar Career of Nation-
Building in U.S. Foreign Relations, in NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND
IRAQ 19,21 (Francis Fukuyama ed., 2006).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 28 ("Counterinsurgency tactics that came into vogue as the conflict
accelerated in the early 1960s saw coordinated development activity as integral to the
overall project of pacifying a conflict zone.").
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repercussions of that conflict, as it did with so many other things,
fundamentally changed the way in which international
development was perceived and enthusiasm for such endeavors
temporarily waned.
After the end of the Cold War, however, the United States
increased the frequency and intensity of international
development efforts.' The Cold War left a swath of weak and
failed states stretching across the globe.9 The problems caused by
such weakened governments and the desire to mitigate those
problems motivated world powers to take on a variety of state-
building missions." In countries such as Somalia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo, leaders of the international community expended
resources in an attempt to shore up those weakened governments,
thereby mitigating the indirect threat posed by transnational
problems." Furthermore, after the murderous attacks of
September 11, 2001, the world became acutely aware that such
nations were also active breeding grounds for terrorist
organizations. 2 Accordingly, reconstruction and development have
again become more than mere humanitarian endeavors; they have
resurfaced as activities perceived as vital for the maintenance of
national security. This is particularly true for the United States,
which as the sole superpower and a symbol of Western democracy,
stands as a principal target for anti-Western terrorists.
Commentators note that "[i]t now seems clear that nation-building
is the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower.
Once that recognition is more widely accepted, there is much the
United States can do to better prepare itself to lead such
missions. ' ' '3
8. Francis Fukuyama, Nation Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,
Introduction to NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 19, 21 (Francis
Fukuyama ed., 2006) [hereinafter Fukuyama, Introduction].
9. Id.
10. Id. (noting that weak or failed states have historically produced refugees, human
rights abuses, inter- and intrastate wars, drug and human trafficking, and other inherently
transnational problems).
11. See generally JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING:
FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ, at xxvii (2003) (describing efforts by organizations such as
NATO, the United Nations, and the United States in providing assistance to troubled
nations).
12. Fukuyama, Introduction, supra note 8 ("And after September 11, 2001, it became
clear that weak or failed states could sponsor terrorism that threatened the core security
interests of the world's sole superpower, the United States.").
13. DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 11, at xxix.
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An integral part of state-building involves the successful
reconstruction and development of essential governmental
institutions as well as legal institutions." In this regard, it is
imperative that the reconstruction of legal institutions and legal
systems be based on a workable paradigm that best suits the needs,
interests, history, and culture of the country being developed.
III. STATE-BUILDING AND LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION
Development theory scholars note an important distinction
between nation-building and state-building-terms which are used
interchangeably but refer to distinct concepts. Nation-building is
the process of constructing a new political order with a shared
identity and a community of shared values."s State-building, in
contrast, refers to the process of constructing (or reconstructing)
state political institutions or promoting economic development."
The former, though not impossible, is difficult and rarely
achieved." The latter, however, has been historically easier to
accomplish."
Within the context of state-building, scholars differentiate
between reconstruction and development: "Reconstruction refers
to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to their pre-
conflict situation. Development, however, refers to the creation of
new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth,
events that transform the society open-endedly into something it
14. See Fukuyama, Introduction, supra note 8, at 6-7 ("[lit is only the ability to create
and maintain self-sustaining indigenous institutions that permits outside powers to
formulate an exit strategy.").
15. Fukuyama, Introduction, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that Europeans criticize
Americans in using the term nation-building when actually referring to state-building).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See generally DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 11 (documenting the success of the
United States in nation-building interests in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan). See also WIARDA, supra note 4, at 109 ("Almost no one knows
how to do it. In the United States we talk enthusiastically of 'nation-building'-a happy,
optimistic phrase but one that almost no one knows how to accomplish, certainly not the
U.S. Defense Department or the State Department, or the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID), or the United Nations-although all of these may contribute."); Ash
U. Bali, Justice Under the Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in
Iraq, 30 YALE J. INTL'L L. 431, 436 (2005) ("At its most ambitious, external nation-
building seeks to replace existing local institutions with new ones, often designed by
foreign experts and imposed from above. The ambition and breadth of such projects,
frequently undertaken in the name of such laudable goals as democratization and
liberalization, lie at the root of their failure.").
[Vol. 29:1
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has not been previously."19 International actors have shown
themselves capable of accomplishing reconstruction, while
development has proven problematic and difficult to effect."
The concepts of legal reconstruction and legal development
relate specifically to the restoration or creation of legal institutions
of weakened or war-torn states.' Just as roads, schools, and
economic institutions must be rebuilt to foster functional states, so
must the legal institutions which serve to resolve disputes, punish
the criminal, and uphold the rule of law. Such judicial
reconstruction benefits local populations by sparing them from the
victimization and instability that accompanies anarchy. The
environment of security also benefits the entity or entities
facilitating post-conflict reconstruction by curbing violent crime
and attacks.2 2  Further, in post-conflict scenarios, legal
reconstruction is a critical element of post-intervention strategies
designed to quell ethnic retaliation such as revenge killings or
"reverse ethnic cleansing."23 The task can also serve to address the
root causes of conflict through the establishment or restoration of
the rule of law.24
Although international development has a long history, legal
reconstruction is a relatively recent phenomenon. Carsten Stahn,
Associate Legal Advisor to the International Criminal Court,
noted that the need to develop a targeted strategy to restore the
rule of law in post-conflict societies first became evident in the
1990s. 2 6 Since that realization, legal reconstruction has played an
integral role in post-conflict crisis management. Today, in the
19. Fukuyama, Introduction, supra note 8, at 4-5 (italics omitted).
20. Id. at 5.
21. See Fukuyama, Introduction, supra note 8 at 4-5.
22. Francis Fukuyama, Guidelines for Future Nation-Builders in Nation Building and
the Failure of Institutional Memory, in NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND
IRAQ, supra note 8, at 315 [hereinafter Fukuyama, Guidelines].
23. See Carsten Stahn, Justice Under Transitional Administration: Contours and
Critique of a Paradigm, 27 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 311, 315 (2005).
24. Id.
25. See Minxin Pei et al., Building Nations: The American Experience, in NATION-
BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, supra note 8, at 64-65 (noting that out of
200 American military interventions since 1900, seventeen (roughly 8 percent) have been
attempts at nation-building through the promotion or imposition of democratic
institutions desired by American policymakers).
26. See Stahn, supra note 23, at 313-14.
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discourse surrounding the conflict in Iraq, it is often cited as a key
part (or "strategic pillar") of the United States' plan for victory.27
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAKENED STATES
Before discussing the various approaches to legal
reconstruction, it is prudent to outline some common
characteristics of weakened states so that one can better
understand the unique challenges of such blighted legal and
political environments. There are numerous terms for such states:
poor nations, third world countries, underdeveloped countries,
developing countries, et cetera. Whatever the name, it is only by
clearly understanding the challenges posed by such states that one
may choose the best approach to legal reconstruction.28 Beneath
the broad rubric of weakened states reside legal systems of
seemingly infinite diversity. The legal traditions in such states are
as diverse as their reasons for underdevelopment.29 Therefore,
27. See generally Nat'l Sec. Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, App.,
Strategic Pillar Six (Nov. 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/
iraq-strategynov2005.html. A "strategic objective" is:
[An] Iraq [which] reforms its legal system and develops institutions capable of
addressing threats to public order. Iraq's government operates consistent with
internationally recognized standards for civil rights and the rule of law.... [T]he
'rule of law' as a concept denotes a government of laws, and not men. It is a
concept that was born in Iraq, thousands of years ago, and also eviscerated
there, over the past three decades, by Saddam Hussein. Iraq is now trying to
reclaim its proud history. It is working to overcome the effects of tyranny by
building a legal system that instills confidence in a new government, ensures that
every person accused of a crime receives due process - including fair, public, and
transparent trials - and a prison system that complies fully with international
standards. The steps taken thus far include establishment of an independent
judiciary, creation of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq and the Iraq Higher
Tribunal, renovation and reconstruction of courthouses throughout Iraq,
establishment of a reformed Iraq Correctional Service, and construction of
modern civilian prison facilities.
Id.
28. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 108 ("The nature of the state-the institutions
through which legitimate power (political authority) is enforced-is central to the study of
politics in any country.").
29. The establishment of peaceful, democratic politics is obstructed by civil war
in Afghanistan, Burundi and Sudan, political assassination in Mexico, ethnic
conflict and separatism in Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Liberia, religious
fundamentalism in Egypt and Algeria, bankrupt absolutism in Zaire and El
Salvador, and the West's willingness to sell arms to any regime, no matter how
repressive. The threat of economic crisis hangs over the fledgling democracies of
Brazil, Malawi, Nepal, Uganda, Angola and Mozambique. Communal violence
persistently mars India's democratic record. Many Third World countries are
faced with accumulations of such factors, and some combine them with severe
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searching for true substantive legal similarities between all
countries so labeled is unavailing. However, in spite of the contrast
in legal cultures, certain characteristics of such states create tragic
commonality.
As a group, weakened states tend to be poor and weak in
almost every respect. Such states are economically, socially, and
politically underdeveloped." They lack infrastructure and viable
institutions."' This multidimensional underdevelopment serves to
perpetuate their predicament.32 For instance, in many politically
unstable countries, where investments are not protected by the
rule of law or a functioning judicial system, it is difficult to attract
foreign aid, and generate the investment necessary to break out of
economic underdevelopment.33 Without foreign aid or investment,
these countries have difficulties developing economically." If they
do not develop, they cannot maintain a system in which
investments are protected by the rule of law and a functioning
judicial system. 5 The result of this cycle is poverty and
underdevelopment leading to the collapse of the state.36 As noted
above, it is in such an environment that terrorist organizations
tend to incubate.
A common characteristic of underdeveloped or weakened
states is the presence of an overdeveloped bureaucracy. Although
bureaucracies have a positive and important role in any
government, unless kept under control, their unrestricted growth is
especially damaging to underdeveloped or weakened countries. 8 A
bloated public sector adversely affects development at all levels."
Ineffective administration increases with the size and power of the
ecological problems.
Id. at 275.
30. WIARDA, supra note 4, at 22-23.





36. See id. at 23-24.
37. See id. at 22-24; see also ANONYMOUS, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 74-78 (2004).
38. See FRED W. RIGGS, ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE
THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY 126 (1964) ( "[Tloo rapid expansion of the bureaucracy
when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective
politics[;] . . . separate political institutions have a better chance to grow if bureaucratic
institutions are relatively weak.").
39. See generally RIGGS, supra note 38.
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bureaucracy."0 Bureaucracy in an underdeveloped nation is like
kudzu" -initially intended for a positive purpose, it now only
grows for its own sake and sucks substance and power from more
important institutions around it. An overdeveloped bureaucracy
also weakens the judiciary. 2
Another defining aspect of many weakened states-and a
direct result of institutional weakness-is pervasive crime.43 Crime
rates in some developing countries have reached levels much
higher than many of the worst neighborhoods in the United
States." Such crime prohibits development by discouraging
investment.4 5 As the United States has learned in Iraq, crime also
hinders development by increasing security costs, retarding
reconstruction efforts, and posing physical danger to troops
engaged in the process of rebuilding.6 As a result of this reality,
international actors in post-conflict scenarios now systematically
engage in the reconstruction and development of domestic justice
systems.47
Understanding the characteristics of weakened states is
critical to state-builders operating in the developing world. By
taking into account the unique challenges they face and
impediments to development, appropriate choices can be made
regarding how funds should be allocated, how institutions should
be restored or developed, and how various issues should be
prioritized. In the context of legal reconstruction, an
40. Id.
41. See Wikipedia, Kudzu, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kudzu (last visited Aug. 29,
2006) (noting that though farmers in the South were encouraged to plant kudzu to reduce
soil erosion, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps planted it widely for
many years, kudzu was soon recognized as a pest weed by the United States Department
of Agriculture and now costs around $500 million annually in lost cropland and control
costs. "Kudzu is sometimes referred to as "the plant that ate the South," a reference to
how kudzu's explosive growth has been most prolific in the southeastern United States
due to nearly ideal growing conditions. Significant sums of money and effort are spent
each growing season to prevent kudzu from taking over roads, bridges, power lines, and
local vegetation.") The analogy to beaurocracies in underdeveloped countries is an apt
one.
42. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 162 ("The judicial system, lacking popular support,
can be exploited by the bureaucracy to assist its abuse of power.").
43. See WIARDA, supra note 4, at 107.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally James Glanz, Insurgents Wage Precise Attacks on Baghdad Fuel,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at A10.
47. See Stahn, supra note 23, at 313.
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understanding of such issues can inform decisions made regarding
the rebuilding and development of legal institutions.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF PREVALENT LEGAL PARADIGMS
Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted in the eighteenth century, "As
an architect, before erecting a large edifice, examines and tests the
soil in order to see whether it can support the weight, so a wise
lawgiver does not begin by drawing up laws that are good in
themselves, but considers first whether the people for whom he
designs them are fit to endure them."48 Applying that sage advice
in a modern context, international actors seeking to reconstruct
the legal system of a particular country should work to understand
the culture and basic principles of that nation's legal system before
undertaking such projects to avoid wasting resources or further
damaging the target nation's legal infrastructure through poorly
planned or ill-fated undertakings.49
Generally, nations adhere to one of three basic legal
paradigms: civil law, common law, or a variant of the Islamic legal
tradition." Though there is often a blending of various aspects of
these paradigms in a single country's legal system, normally one
style is dominant enough to determine the state's legal identity.
These legal systems are closely identified with their procedural
methods: civil law is noted for its inquisitorial procedure, common
law is noted for its adversarial procedure, and the Islamic tradition
possesses a unique procedural method that is based on religious
considerations and centered around the qadi.
A. The Inquisitorial Model
Countries that adhere to the continental civil law system
generally adopt an inquisitorial legal procedure." The inquisitorial
48. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE ON
THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF INEQUALITY AMONG MANKIND 46 (Lester G.
Crocker ed., Washington Square Press 1967) (1762).
49. See generally Herbert Jacob, Introduction to COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1-15 (1996); see also Doris Marie Provine, Courts in the
Political Process in France, in COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra, 177, 207.
50. See MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHAI YERUSHALMI,
ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1988) ("Common
law, civil law, and Islamic law are the three principal contemporary legal traditions,
embracing the legal activities and philosophies of the majority of nations.").
51. See Provine, supra note 49, at 207.
2007]
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model is judge-centered. During the investigation of an alleged
crime, a special judge is placed in charge of the investigation,
compiles evidence, and reports to the court that will hear the
52case.
Trials in such systems are less complex, less technical, and less
reliant upon lawyers than those in adversarial systems. 3 Even so,
this does not mean that lawyers have no role in the process, only
that their role is secondary-monitoring the proceedings to ensure
fairness for their clients and only occasionally injecting themselves
into the process." At an inquisitorial trial, the judge dominates the
process, asking or approving all questions posed to witnesses.5
Lawyers do not interrupt the interrogation, nor do they cross-
examine the witnesses. 6 The judge in such a system is




The most celebrated (and most replicated) example of the
inquisitorial legal system is that of France. There, once a crime has
been committed, the suspect is brought in for an initial period of
questioning referred to as garde a vue.8 Until recently, authorities
could hold a suspect for up to 24 hours under garde a vue without a
formal charge, without revealing that he or she is the primary
suspect, or advising the suspect of his or her right to remain silent.59
Though suspects had the right to remain silent, authorities were
only required to advise them of that right during judicial
interrogations-not police interrogations.' Suspects did (and still
do), however, have the right to withdraw any pretrial confession."
In 2000, France passed a law requiring that suspects be advised of
their rights during garde a vue, including their right to remain
52. See id. at 209.
53. See generally id. at 209, 213; see also Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional
Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV.
441, 457 (1997).
54. See Provine, supra note 49, at 213.
55. See id.
56. See generally id.
57. See Smith, supra note 53, at 458.
58. See ERIKA FAIRCHILD & HARRY R. DAMMER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
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silent.62 However, exercise of that right may still give rise to an
adverse inference of guilt.63
During the pretrial investigation, the accused has the right to
an attorney and the right to remain silent.' The judicial
investigator or examining magistrate, known as the juge
d'instruction, works with police to gather facts, interview witnesses,
and question the accused. 5 After the investigation, the juge
d'instruction forwards his or her findings to the Indicting Chamber
of the Court of Appeals. This body, in turn, determines whether or
not the evidence adduced warrants a trial.' Although juries may
hear cases in the courts of assize, which hear the most serious
criminal cases, most civil law countries that employ the
inquisitorial model do not have jury trials.67
The criminal processes of most other civil law countries
operate similarly to the process outlined above. Nevertheless,
many countries, such as Italy and Germany, have eliminated the
position of the examining magistrate in the pretrial investigation
and created a role for the prosecutor to prepare the government's
68case.
One of the most characteristic features of the civil law system
is that of codification. 9 Though the existence of a code is not
absolutely necessary in a civil law system, uncodified jurisdictions
exist as an exception to the general rule of codification." Civil law
codes differ markedly from similarly named compilations of law in
common law countries in that civil law codes are complete and
systematic, expressing a common cultural view of the law.7' Over
62. See Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581,
595 (2001).
63. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, at 149.
64. See id. at 147-48.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 149.
68. Id. at 150.
69. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
26-33 (Stanford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1985) (1969).
70. Id. at 26.
71. An entirely different set of ideals and assumptions is associated with the
California Civil Code, or with the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in any
American jurisdiction. Even though such codes may look very much like a
French or German code, they are not based on the same ideology, and they do
not express anything like the same cultural reality. Where such codes exist, they
make no pretense of completeness.
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the past few centuries, this view of codification has spread across
the globe along with the civil law tradition:
Like the work of the Glossators and Commentators, which was
received together with the Corpus Juris Civilis in Europe, the
ideas of European publicists and scholars of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries have been adopted, together with the form
of European codification, in the civil law nations of Latin
America, Asia, and Africa. 2
One of the most distinguishing features of the civil law system
is its hierarchy of legal sources.7 "According to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law.
They are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources of law,
such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity
that may guide the court in reaching a decision in the absence of
legislation and custom."" Thus, the primary basis of law in civil law
countries is legislation and not prior decisions of the courts (as in
the common law tradition). The effect of this is that the concept of
stare decisis is foreign to civil law. Civil law courts will not rely on a
single case as rationale for a particular decision. Rather, civil law
courts will look for a string of consistent, unbroken opinions that
form a steady line of reasoning. This is referred to as jurisprudence
constante.75
See id. at 32.
72. Id. at 32-33.
73. Unquestionably, the most striking difference between the civil and common
systems of law is to be found in the psychological attitudes of the judiciary
toward legislation. The difference in attitude mirrors the differences that
distinguish common and civil law lawyers in terms of the question of where a
lawyer will, in the first instance, look for the source of law. In common law
jurisdictions, judges tend to construe statutes narrowly and, at times, even ignore
them as of inferior force. In contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, judges, like
lawyers, begin their reasoning process by looking to the applicable codification
which, through techniques like analogical reasoning, are regarded as capable of
covering any conceivable situation that may arise.
See Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in
the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons From the Civil Law and Realist
Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173,201 (2000).
74. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1(b) (1999).
75. See BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 15 (1982) (articulating the
distinction between the strict English rule of stare decisis and French rule of precedent
involving the deference only to a harmonious series of decisions); see also A. L. Goodhart,
Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 40, 42 (1934) (explaining the




Aside from France, the civil law/inquisitorial model prevails
in the majority of countries across the globe, such as Germany,
Italy, Spain, Turkmenistan, Senegal, Rwanda, and Benin.76 It is
also the legal model upon which the Iraqi legal system is based."
Though there are differences in practice and procedure, the
criminal procedure of most Socialist countries is also derived from
the criminal procedure of civil law countries and shares many of its
basic characteristics]8
B. The Adversarial Model
Countries that adhere to the common law tradition have
generally adopted the adversarial model of legal procedure." In
contrast to the inquisitorial model, the adversarial model is much
more attorney-centered. The role of the judge is passive, while
attorneys face off as adversaries.' The parties have the sole
responsibility of investigating the circumstances of their case and
presenting to the fact-finder that information they deem relevant.81
The role of the judge is frequently characterized as that of an
umpire or, as one commentator has described it, a hostage to the
tactics of the attorneys before them.' The United States and
England are the most prominent examples of this model of legal
procedure.
The adversarial procedure resembles a type of competition in
which the passive, neutral judge exists only to decide whether each
side played by the rules and then declare the victor. In the event
that the proceeding is a jury trial, the judge ensures the fairness of
the contest and the jury decides the winner.' Procedural
advantages favor the accused, who has the right to remain silent,
the right to an attorney, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to
confront his or her accusers. 85 The right to remain silent is central
to the adversarial system and, in large part, shapes the proceeding
76. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, app. D at 357-59.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 151.
79. See Herbert Jacob, Courts and Politics in the United States, in COURTS, LAW, AND
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 49, at 16, 23.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 24.
82. See id.; see also FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, at 140.
83. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, at 140-41.
84. Id. at 141.
85. Id.
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by forcing the government to prove the guilt of the accused
without the accused's cooperation.'
In the United States, before being questioned by the police, a
person taken into custody generally must be informed of his or her
right to remain silent and right to an attorney.87 Moreover, during
trial, a prosecutor may not comment unfavorably on the exercise
of the right to remain silent.' In contemporary England, on the
other hand, adverse inferences of guilt may be inferred from an
accused's silence, an aspect which gives suspects motivation to
cooperate with interrogators. 9 Furthermore, an accused can be
denied access to a lawyer in England for up to 36 hours, or in
certain cases such as those involving terrorism, up to 48 hours."
The common law/adversarial model prevails most famously in
the United States and England, but also in nations such as Malawi,
Nepal, and Zambia." Though not as prevalent as the civil law
system, it certainly qualifies as one of the world's major legal
traditions.
C. The Islamic Legal Tradition
The Islamic legal tradition diverges from both the
inquisitorial system and the adversarial system in that' it is
extremely judge-oriented-but the judge is passive in many
respects. In fact, Islamic legal tradition is so oriented around the
judge (or qadi) that this legal system is referred to occasionally as
"qadi justice."' It is a distinct form of procedure in which justice is
dispensed by an Islamic judge.93 The qadi derives his authority from
the Qur'an and proceeds in accordance with the legal tradition of
one of the various schools of Islam.' Thus, states adhering to
86. See id. at 143.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Since passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, the
status of the right to remain silent in England has been altered. Previously, the
accused could not be required to incriminate him- or herself, and silence could
not be taken to infer guilt. But since passage of the act, it is possible for guilt to
be inferred by silence, and so there is pressure on the accused to waive the right
to silence when being questioned by police.
FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, at 143.
90. Id. at 142.
91. Id. app. D, at 357-59.





Islamic legal tradition will turn to individual Islamic legal
traditions and the Qur'an to define their procedure." Although
this may lead to a hierarchy of courts and formalized procedure,
the rights of the accused are generally regarded as secondary to
the need for justice and community welfare.96
Although Joseph Schacht argued that there really is "no
general concept of penal law" in Islam,"7 scholars note that there
are separate categories of offenses which roughly correspond to
what Western legal systems consider to be criminal law: Qur'anic
crimes (hudfid), offenses against the person (qisds or jindydt), and
the discretionary power of state authorities to punish sinful
behavior and acts that endanger the security of the state or
infringe upon public order (ta 'zTr and siy5sa)9
What may have inspired Schacht's view of Islamic penal law is
the fact that public prosecution does not exist in the purely Islamic
legal system-at least not as the Western jurist knows it. A
claimant is required before any redress can be given. Although this
gives rise to Schacht's view that all actions in Islamic law are, in
essence, private ones,' it is best conceptualized outside of the
public/private dichotomy of Western legal thought and within the
context of Islam. In that regard, all actions are essentially religious
100
concerns.
As the Islamic legal tradition has no equivalent to a public
prosecutor, a claimant is necessary in order for the Islamic legal
system to take action or give redress."0 ' Parties seeking justice may
come before the qadi for a large range of issues because the qadi
has vast jurisdictional competence.1 2 The qadi will generally not
95. See id. at 159-60.
96. Id. at 159.
97. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 187 (Clarendon Press
1982) (1964).
98. See Rudolph Peters, Islamic and Secular Criminal Law in Nineteenth Century
Egypt: The Role and Function of the Qadi, 4 ISLAMIC L. & SOC'Y 70, 71 (1997).
99. See SCHACHT, supra note 97, at 113 ("None of the modern systematic distinctions,
between private and 'public' law, or between civil and penal law, or between substantive
and adjective law, exists within the religious law of Islam; there is even no clear separation
of worship, ethics, and law proper.").
100. See LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 50, at 2 ("Islamic law is a system based upon
'Gods commands ... having an existence independent of society imposed upon society
from above.' The law's religious derivation and purposes are the basis of its authority, in
contrast to European legal systems which derive their standing from an association with
the state and its political processes.").
101. See SCHACHT, supra note 97, at 189.
102. In fact, the competence of the kadi is limited by the rule that he cannot give
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seek out actions. '°3 Instead, parties must come to the qadi to find
the resolution to a dispute.' " However, there are examples in
Ottoman Egypt, in cases involving ta 'z~r offenses, of the qadi acting
as an examining magistrate, presenting a report of the facts to
administrative authorities who would then prosecute the suspect.1"
Further, once seized of a matter, the qadi could investigate the
veracity of witnesses'" or even send minions to apprehend accused
wrongdoers.' °7
A qadi may authorize a variety of harsh punishments, from
lashes and amputations to stoning and crucifixion." Aggrieved
parties may also request payment of blood-money or even
permission to retaliate-an eye for an eye.'" This draconian
approach to justice, which is most extreme in fundamentalist
countries, is a source of criticism by human rights advocates, and,
for many citizens of the developing world, an enduring source of
the traditional Islamic legal system's appeal."' The promise of law
and order, irresistible to those without the security of an effective
government, has ushered in hard-line Islamic governments in
countries such as Afghanistan, and, most recently, Somalia. For a
brief period of time, an Islamic faction called the Islamic Courts
judgment against an absent party (ghc" ib) who is not represented by a deputy.
The kadi cannot give judgment in favour of his near relatives. On the other hand,
his competence extends beyond the judicial office, and includes the control of
property of the missing person, the orphan, the foundling, and the person with
restricted capacity to dispose, of found objects, pious foundations, and estates of
inheritance. His power to dispose goes further than that of the guardian, even
than that of the father; he may, for instance, leid the money of an orphan. His
approval validates acts of unauthorized agency in these fields.
Id. at 188.
103. Id. at 190.
104. Id. at 188.
105. See Peters, supra note 98.
106. See WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 86
(2005) (noting that certain individuals were employed by every Islamic court to inquire
into the integrity of potential witnesses and report back to the qadi on what they had
learned of the potential witness's character).
107. See Id. (noting that the courts of the eighth century also included assistants whose
duty it was to locate and apprehend defendants and witnesses).
108. See SCHACHT, supra note 97, at 175-76.
109. Id. at 183-86.
110. Illustrating this dichotomy, on the same day that the New York Times reported on
the negative effect of Islam on Indonesian women, it also reported on the stoning ordered
by a popular militant Islamist movement that has recently taken governmental control in
Somalia. See Jane Perlez, Spread of Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes Toll on Women, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2006 at Al; Reuters, Islamists in Somalia Say They Plan to Execute 5
Rapists by Stoning, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006 at 9.
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Union swept across lawless Somalia and imposed a fundamentalist
variant of Islamic law."'
Variants of the Islamic legal tradition prevail in many Middle
Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates."2  Many Middle Eastern countries,
however, adopted civil law systems based on the French model."3
Thus, different countries have very different perceptions of
law and the proper functioning of a legal system. Depending on
the circumstance, what may seem like a good idea in the familiar
legal system of the international actor imposing change may be a
terrible idea in the legal context of rebuilding the nation. Whether
the question is of the role of the judge, the presence of the
prosecutor, or the extent of a legal right, one must take into
consideration a country's legal culture in a holistic sense-
understanding the complete system before tampering with a part
of it. Accordingly, international actors seeking to effect legal
reconstruction must take a comparative approach to legal
reconstruction, making legally appropriate choices when
instituting reform.
VI. DAMASKA'S DIFFERENTIATION
As discussed more fully below, understanding and focusing
resources on empowering organic legal systems has numerous
111. Fredrick Nzwili, Leadership Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts Union, TERRORISM
FoCus (The Jamestown Found., Washington, DC), June 13, 2006, at 5, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370028.
112. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, app. D, at 357-59.
113. These former British colonies notwithstanding, reception in the Arab Middle
East is essentially one of civil laws. A distinction can be drawn here between
countries under direct French-or civil law-based traditions, and countries where
domination was British, but where the civil law tradition was nonetheless
preferred. For the former, the French impact can be described as massive and
wholesale. For the latter, there were more nuances in the introduction of
French-style codes. There, the amalgamation of several traditions, including the
shari'a's, offers a richer and more complex legal picture. The difference,
however, is more of degree than in nature. The group of countries belonging to
the category under direct French influence includes three states in the
Maghreb-Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia-and Lebanon and Syria in the
Levant. Under civil law lato sensu, it also includes Libya, which was under
Italian domination, and Mauritania and the Western Sahara, which fell under
Spanish rule. The second category of countries, which were essentially under
British sway, but which "received" the civil law, include Iraq, Jordan, and
Palestine-Israel.
Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field (Part II),
52 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 278-79 (2004).
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advantages. Therefore, international actors engaging in state-
building should understand the different legal paradigms (such as
those described above) so that they may better allocate resources
and preserve the legitimacy of institutions being rebuilt. Even so,
occasions may arise in which the organic legal system is
nonexistent or so hopelessly violative of human rights and
international norms that the complex task of legal development
must be undertaken. In such cases, state-builders should still
refrain from reflexively altering the legal system of the occupied
state merely to bring them into accord with their own juridical
conceptions. Rather, international actors should carefully analyze
the culture, circumstances and needs of the state in question and,
based on those findings, construct the most suitable legal order. In
that regard, the comparative analysis posited by Mirjan R.
Damagka is instructive.
Mirjan R. Dama~ka, Professor of Foreign and Comparative
Law at the Yale Law School, argues that criminal systems should
be divided into two different frameworks: a conflict-solving model
and a policy-implementing model."4 In Damagka's analysis, these
frameworks are more or less suitable, depending on the aims of
the state. Damagka describes a reactive state, which only desires to
provide a supporting framework within which its citizens are free
to pursue their respective goals, and the activist state which, in
contrast, takes a more direct role in shaping society."5
A. The Reactive State and the Conflict-Solving Proceeding
As defined by Dama~ka, governmental minimalism is a
116characteristic of the reactive state. 6 Governmental goals are
limited to protecting social order and providing a forum for the
resolution of disputes that cannot first be settled by the citizenry."7
The state does not impose a certain view of social or moral good
on its citizens, and only exists as a passive entity under which a
114. MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 88 (1986).
115. Id. at 73, 80.
116. The task of the reactive state is limited to providing a supporting framework
within which its citizens pursue their chosen goals. Its instruments must set free
spontaneous forces of self-management. The state contemplates no notion of
separate interest apart from social and individual (private) interests: there are
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plurality of diverse groups may operate."' The reactive state, as a
general rule, only interferes when requested.'9
The law under such a system considers private agreements
among citizens paramount. 20 State law exists only as a model and,
being subsidiary in nature, it can be modified or displaced by
agreement.' 2' However, citizens who cannot arrive at an individual
agreement have to be content to have their arrangement governed
by the state's model solution.'22
Because one of the few governmental objectives of the
reactive state is to facilitate resolution of disputes, the legal
process in such a system is important. 123 Legal disputes tend to take
on the form of a contest between parties in which the state
apparatus takes a passive, mediating role.'24
The reactive state emphasizes the sovereignty of the
individual over the government's interest in shaping the social
order.'2' Thus, its legal process takes the form of a contest between
parties to a dispute.'26 The state takes on the role of a conflict
solver in the dispute and serves as an umpire in the contest.' 27 The
parties, on the other hand, are vested with a large degree of
control over the proceedings.'2 Parties decide when to begin a
action, determine whether or not the action should be withdrawn,
and shape the nature and content of the legal arguments
advanced.'29 Moreover, parties are tasked with the obligation of
adducing proof at these proceedings because the reactive state is
far too passive to engage in an official investigation.'30 The
decision-maker in such a system is impartial and operates as a
judicial tabula rasa upon which the parties to the dispute inscribe
facts.'3'
118. DAMASKA, supra note 114, at 75.
119. Id. at 73.
120. Id. at 75.
121. Id. at 76.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 77.
124. See id. at 77-78.
125. DAMASKA, SUpra note 114, at 104.
126. Id. at 79.
127. See id. at 79-80.
128. Id. at 104.
129. Id. at 109-11.
130. DAMAKA,SUpra note 114, at 111.
131. Id. at 137-38.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Another characteristic of the conflict-solving paradigm is a
reluctance to extend legal standing to parties not personally
involved in the dispute.'32 Accordingly, a general stake in the
procedural outcome of a dispute is inadequate to confer
standing. '33 This comports with the reactive state's passive
philosophy-only solve disputes that arise between individual
parties and do not expand litigation to remedy a broader
problem.'34 Litigation, therefore, takes on a decidedly personal
scope. 3 5
B. The Activist State and the Policy-Implementing Paradigm
The activist state does not assume a minimalist role, but, in
contrast, espouses a certain definition of social good and seeks to
shape society to conform to its demands."6 Such a government
places a strong emphasis on a shared sense of citizenship,
harmony, and cooperation.'37 Moreover, the law in an activist state
emanates from the sovereign rather than from private
agreements."" Law is more formative than in the reactive state -a
tool by which the state accomplishes its desired social results. 9
As a result of the characteristics of an activist state, legal
proceedings focus less on resolution of private disputes and tend to
take on the form of an inquest.'4 ° This is because legal proceedings
in an activist state must be structured so as to permit a search for
the best policy response to the event under consideration-not
merely to resolve a conflict.'
According to Damagka, the legal process of an activist state
organizes around the central idea of an official inquiry and devotes
132. DAMASKA, supra note 114, at 116.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 117.
135. See id. 116-17.
136. Id. at 80.
137. Such a state does more than adopt a few propulsive policies and welfare
programs. It espouses or strives toward a comprehensive theory of the good life
and tries to use it as a basis for a conceptually all-encompassing program of
material and moral betterment of its citizens. All spheres of social life, even
matters that take place in pianissimo, can at least be evaluated in terms of state
policy and shaped to its demands.
Id.
138. DAMASKA, supra note 114, at 82.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 87.
141. Id.
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itself to the implementation of state policy.'42 Emphasizing the
sovereignty of the state over that of the individual, the state can
commence a legal action even where an aggrieved individual fails
or neglects to do so.' The activist state can even initiate a
proceeding without an underlying dispute between parties.'" The
state retains control over when to commence and withdraw legal
actions.'45 Therefore, legal proceedings in an activist state resemble
less a clash of adverse parties and more an inquiry conducted by
the state to determine the truth of a matter and decide the best
policy or outcome.' 6 Parties have a duty to cooperate with this
inquiry but are never afforded control over the proceeding.' 7 In
fact, parties can be forced to cooperate in such proceedings to
assist the state in deciding the outcome.' 8 The decision-maker
must not necessarily be impartial, but must be just in its
decisions.' As the proceeding does not revolve around two
different sides of an argument, favoring one side is less
important.'0 What is most important is coming to the best result
and implementing state policy."'
Whether a Conflict-Solving or a Policy-Implementing legal
system is more desirable depends on the needs of the country
under construction. In making such determination, international
actors should take into consideration the unique characteristics of
weakened states, including the exorbitant crime rates, multifaceted
impoverishment, and lack of security. 2 Given the needs of the
country in question, it may well be that the most critical need for a
government is to implement policies designed to counter a specific
threat or effect a desired result.
142. DAMASKA, supra note 114, at 87.
143. Id. at 84.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 87.
147. Id.
148. DAMA8KA, supra note 114, at 87.
149. Id. at 86.
150. Id. at 85-86.
151. Id. at 87.
152. See supra notes 28-47, and accompanying text.
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VII. THE ADVANTAGE OF ORGANIC LEGAL SYSTEMS
The wholesale re-creation of a legal system is a task of
extraordinary complexity.' 3 In the context of state-building, not
only must one successfully create a legal system that is
theoretically functional, but one must then teach this system to a
country of lawyers, judges, and legal personnel that have, up to
that point in their legal existence, conceived of law and legal
practice differently. Accordingly, the most successful programs to
restore the rule of law in weakened or failed states have been
those rooted in the traditions of the local citizenry.'" This is true
not only because pre-existing organic legal systems often have the
advantage of being tested through years of legal practice, but also
because organic institutions are more likely to be perceived as
legitimate."' Historical evidence from the colonial period indicates
that maintaining and empowering the organic legal institutions
encourages stability by preserving governmental legitimacy.' A
legitimacy deficit can lead to rejection, which can quickly lead to
failure. As Ash U. Bali notes:
The better model for a more robust nation-building project
would be indigenous ownership of both institutional design and
implementation along with external logistical support. For new
state institutions to be stable and durable, they must be the
product of local political bargains commanding sufficient
153. See Eugene R. Fidell, et al., Military Commission Law, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2005, at
47 (noting that establishing any legal system from scratch is more difficult than creators
anticipate, as revisions create unforeseen internal inconsistencies and inevitable
procedural gaps).
154. See Marcia Coyle, Toward an Iraqi Legal System, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 2003, at A6
(quoting Paul van Zyl, director for country programs at the International Center for
Transitional Justice, as saying that the most successful programs to bring the rule of law to
former dictatorships have been rooted in or "owned" by the local citizenry).
155. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 36-37.
156. Britain's need for political control and the maintenance of stability was
consistent with the preservation of indigenous practices. In many parts of West
Africa, for example, with the exception of inhuman punishments for criminal
offences defined according to local customary law, existing customs and laws
were left intact. It was far easier to keep a population quiescent when it was
partly governed by its own institutions, laws, and customs, although ultimately
subject to the local representatives of the British Crown. A hierarchy of colonial
officials extended from the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the apex down
to district commissioners in charge of large populations and supervising the
exercise of customary law by indigenous judges and law-makers regarded as
legitimate by the local population.
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consensus to bolster their perceived legitimacy.-
57
Another consideration for international actors effecting legal
reconstruction is the regime of international legal rules governing
occupation.'' Article 43 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land requires that
an occupying power "re-establish and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country. ' '59 In his Commentary
on the Geneva Convention, Jean S. Pictet expressly notes that this
language means that an occupying power may not alter the legal
system of the occupied state merely to bring it into accord with the
occupier's own jurisprudential conceptions."
Therefore, there are practical and legal reasons for choosing
to empower the organic legal systems of weakened or failed states
rather than creating new systems altogether or unnaturally altering
them to conform to more familiar legal institutions. Accordingly,
the first course of action for international actors seeking to effect
legal reconstruction should be to undertake a study of that organic
legal system, learn how the target nation perceives the law, and
then determine how it can be empowered so that order, stability,
and the rule of law can be restored.
VIII. THE ADVANTAGE OF MINIMALISM
Leading scholars on the subject of state-building have
advocated designing operations with a "light footprint. ' .6' Francis
Fukuyama notes that such a model builds early local ownership
and is more sustainable by foreign donors and taxpayers.' Such
considerations are important because state-building is an
enormously expensive endeavor. In the 1940s, the Marshall Plan
157. Bali, supra note 18, at 438-39 ("Prevailing in a military battle against a weak state
with limited defensive capacities is scarcely a qualification for the job of nation-
building.").
158. See THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1899 (II) AND 1907 (IV) RESPECTING THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND art. 43 (James Brown Scott ed., 1915).
159. See id.
160. See JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTAIRE: IV LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE
RELATIVE A LA PROTECTION DES PERSONNES CIVILES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE 360
(Comite International de Croix Rouge, 1956).
161. See Fukuyama, Guidelines, supra note 22, at 242-43.
162. See id.
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for Europe cost over $13 billion.'63 Today, the state-building effort
in Iraq costs the United States government, on average, $4.5
billion per month." Given that such operations are likely to recur
and be funded by the same taxpayers, it is important that they be
politically sustainable on both ends. By focusing on a minimalist
approach to state-building, maximizing the impact of assets on the
ground and avoiding redundant institutions, international actors
can preserve the legitimacy of the government being restored in a
way that maintains domestic political support.
By advocating a minimalist approach to state-building, this
article does not imply that state-building endeavors should
necessarily employ a small number of troops-only that
international actors should seek to maximize organic resources
and use no more external manpower than necessary. Personnel
who could be perceived as outsiders should be used as sparingly as
the mission will allow. It is important to note that state-building
often requires large numbers of troops to secure the peace so that
development can begin. Those troops must then remain and
maintain the peace while development continues.'65 However, the
footprint should be as light as possible in order to accomplish the
desired objective of development.
Military personnel are not the only actors involved in state-
building. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) are often key
players and no less subject to the demands of a minimalist
approach. An overabundance of NGOs can just as easily be
perceived as a kind of occupation.'" It can also serve to inflate
prices in the target country to a damaging degree and undermine
163. See MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952, at 337 (Louis Galambos & Robert
Gallman eds., 1989).
164. See Johanna Mendelson Forman, Striking Out in Baghdad: How Postconflict
Reconstruction Went Awry, in NATION BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ,
supra note 8, at 196, 196.
165. See id. at 196-99.
166. By mid-2003, no fewer than two thousand national and international NGOs
were operating in Afghanistan, mainly in the fields of poverty reduction,
education, and health. Most viewed the civil administration as intrusive and
bumbling. They therefore preferred to distance themselves from the government
at both the national and local levels. As the number of NGO workers killed in
the line of duty grew, the gap of understanding between NGOs and the
government became an alarming chasm.
S. Frederick Starr, Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building, in NATION
BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, supra note 8, at 107,116.
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the legitimacy of local government and institutions.67 S. Frederick
Starr notes:
At a meeting in Kabul in April 2004, shortly after the Berlin
donor's conference, Ramazan Bashar Dost, Afghan minister of
planning, declared that it would do more harm than good if aid
money were given directly to NGOs rather than channeled
through the government. In November 2004, he put it more
bluntly: 'I have yet to see a NGO that has spent 80% of its
money for the Afghans.' Strong words, but solidly grounded in
reality. Donors were blind to the extent to which the work of
the NGOs undermined local administrators in the public's
mind. Worse, they were blind to the Afghan's view that the
delivery of services at the local level was one of the two prime
tests of the government's legitimacy.1
6
1
Therefore, while NGOs and other such entities are helpful,
they should be subject to the same minimalist analysis-not
viewed as a per se benefit, but a potential benefit that could
become a liability if not economically allocated.
Minimalism also counsels that organic institutions be
empowered and revitalized, rather than new entities and
institutions be created from whole cloth. This not only avoids a
legitimacy deficit and fosters greater security, it decreases the cost
of state-building by focusing resources on established entities-
rather than requiring that institutions be rebuilt from scratch. In
addition, it decreases the "footprint" of the occupier by using local
nationals already engaged in and familiar with the functioning of
that organic institution.
Another advantage of this approach is that of rapidity.
Empowering an existing institution (such as a criminal court) is a
quicker and shorter process than that of creating a new court,
educating the employees, funding the project, etc. For instance, the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was able to get Iraqi courts
functional in a matter of months,169 but after years of effort has not
been able to create a legitimate, functional mechanism capable of
addressing the property concerns of displaced Iraqis.' ° In an
167. See id.
168. Seeid. at 117.
169. See L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator, Opening
Remarks at Press Conference (Oct. 9, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/transcripts/20031009_Oct-09Bremerpresscon.htm).
170. See Dan E. Stigall, Courts, Confidence, and Claims Commissions: The Case for
Remitting to Iraqi Civil Courts the Tasks and Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Property Claims
20071
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environment in which security needs to be quickly established, and
in which the lack thereof is measured by a body count, the
advantage of rapidity cannot be overstated.
Further, as discussed above, one of the factors that impede
development in weakened states is the existence of an
overdeveloped bureaucracy.'' Creating additional commissions,
tribunals, and councils, when the already-existing organic
institutions (if properly empowered) could handle the task, only
exacerbates that problem. Therefore, international actors engaged
in legal reconstruction should eschew such superfluous
bureaucracy-building and focus their efforts on rebuilding organic
institutions.
IX. IRAQ: A CASE STUDY
The current state-building operation in Iraq is the most
ambitious and extensive in modern history. Never before have so
many U.S. resources been devoted to the rehabilitation of a
foreign government. Part of that reconstructive effort has required
a familiarization with the Iraqi legal system - a legal system that
had, until recently, been largely ignored by the Western world. A
review of this legal system reveals that the legal system of Iraq,
though influenced by elements of the Islamic legal tradition, is
based on the continental civil law system. 2 Therefore, in
discussing the basic criminal and civil structure of the Iraqi legal
system, the reader will note several similarities with the French
system discussed above.
A. Iraqi Criminal Law
Since the 1970s, criminal procedure in Iraq has been
ostensibly governed by the Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings. 3
Commission (IPCC), ARMY LAW., Mar. 2005, at 28 [hereinafter Stigall, Courts,
Confidence, and Claims Commissions]; see also Edward Wong, Kurds Are Flocking to
Kirkuk, Laying Claim to Land and Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2005, at A12 (noting that
Kurdish Iraqis who were to find recourse in the Iraqi Property Claims Commission are
now taking matters into their own hands).
171. RIGGS, supra note 38, at 74.
172. See Mallat, supra note 113, at 209.
173. See Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, No. 23 of 1971, Decree No.
230 (1971) (Iraq), available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/
IraqiCriminalProcedureCode.pdf [hereinafter Law on Criminal Proceedings].
174. John C. Williamson, Establishing Rule of Law in Post-War Iraq: Rebuilding the
Justice System, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 240 (2004).
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Although the Ba'athist regime flouted the rule of law, '74 it was and
remains the law governing criminal procedure in Iraq.
According to Iraqi law, once a crime has been committed, it
can be initially investigated by any number of government officials
which are designated as "investigating officers" by the Iraqi Law
on Criminal Proceedings.' Those officials include police officers,
mayors of villages, railway stationmasters, train conductors, heads
of government, and other public servants."6 These investigating
officers investigate alleged crimes, collect evidence, and then
submit all collected evidence to the examining magistrate." ' Any
investigating officer may obtain the assistance of the police,' 8 but
his task ends once the examining magistrate or a representative of
the Public Prosecutor's Office arrives." The statements of the
accused should be recorded along with a statement of evidence in
favor of the accused.' 8
The examining magistrate or investigator must question the
accused within 24 hours of his arrival, after proving his identity to
the accused and informing the accused of the offense of which he
is suspected.'8 ' The accused has the right to make his statement to
the examining magistrate at any time after listening to the
statements of any witness, or request that certain witnesses be
summoned for discussion of the facts.'" He also has the right to
refuse to answer any question posed.'7 The accused is not to be
placed under oath unless giving a statement as a witness for other
defendants."
Although Saddam Hussein's government routinely ignored
such provisions, Iraqi law prohibits the use of torture or unduly
coercive tactics to obtain a confession.'" Further, if a confession is
175. Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 173, bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, para. 39.
176. Id.
177. Id. para. 41.
178. Id. para. 45.
179. Id. para. 46.
180. Id. ch. 5, para. 123.
181. Id.
182. Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 173, bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, para. 124.
183. Id. para. 126.
184. Id.
185. Id. para. 127 ("The use of any illegal method to influence the accused and extract
a confession is not permitted. Mistreatment, threats, injury, enticement, promises,
psychological influence or use of drugs or intoxicants are considered illegal methods.").
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obtained, certain provisions exist to ensure its voluntariness, such
as a requirement that the examining magistrate read it back to the
accused, and a requirement that the recorded statement be
signed."6 If the accused wishes to write his statement in his own
hand, the examining magistrate must allow him to do so.'
If, after the investigation, the examining magistrate finds no
evidence of a crime or that there is no action punishable by law, he
issues a decision rejecting the case and closing the file.'" If,
however, he does find sufficient evidence of a crime, he transfers
the evidence and the accused to the appropriate court. 9 The court
then, upon receipt of the case file, sets a date for trial and must
notify parties of that date. 9' The trial takes place with all parties in
attendance'9' and the proceedings are open unless closed by the
court for reasons of security or decency.'"
In the event that the crime is a felony, it is referred to the
Court of Felony and a lawyer is appointed for the accused if he or
she does not already have one. '93 That lawyer must prepare the
defense for the accused and represent him or her at trial or face a
monetary penalty.'94
At trial, witnesses are sworn and interrogated by the judge.
9 5
The witness gives his or her testimony orally and may be
interrupted during its delivery. "6 While the court may ask any
questions it deems necessary to clarify the facts, the public
prosecutor, or the complainant, may only discuss testimony and
request clarifications through the court.'97 As in the English and
French systems, the court may ask the defendant questions at trial
and a refusal to answer may lead to adverse inferences of guilt.
98
186. Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 173, bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, para. 128.
187. Id.
188. Id. para. 130.
189. Id.
190. Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 173, bk. 3, pt. 2, para. 130.
191. Id. para. 147.
192. Id. pt. 3, para. 152.
193. Id. pt. 2, para. 144.
194. Id.
195. Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 173, bk. 3, pt. 3, para. 168.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. para. 179.
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B. Iraqi Civil Law
The Iraqi civil law system is also modeled after the French
system-and is characterized by a civil code that has been lauded
as one of Iraq's greatest legal achievements.9 ' The Iraqi Code's
initial articles are strikingly similar to many other civil codes based
on the French model. The first article of the Iraqi Civil Code states
that "legislative provisions shall apply to all matters covering these
provisions in letter trend and content."2" Article 2 states that "[i]n
the absence of any applicable legislative provisions in the law the
court shall adjudicate according to custom and usage."2 '
Furthermore, in the absence of custom and usage, courts shall rule
in accordance with the principles of the Islamic Shari'a which are
most consistent with the provisions of the Iraqi Civil Code, though
courts are not bound by any specific school of thought.2 2
Otherwise, the Iraqi Code states that courts are to rule "in




These provisions reflect a decidedly civilian hierarchy of legal
sources: government legislation and custom are primary and
everything else is secondary. "Though the Iraqi Civil Code makes
a cultural bow to [the Islamic legal tradition] by including such
principles as secondary sources of legislation, the positive law of
the civil code is clearly dominant.,
2
1
C. Post-Ba'athist Legal Reconstruction
Immediately after the fall of the Ba'athist regime, Coalition
personnel met with senior members of the Iraqi Ministry of Justice
to determine the needs of the judiciary so that it could be rebuilt.
20°
The Coalition allocated resources to the judiciary based upon what
the domestic legal institutions indicated as their most pressing
needs.0 6 The U.S. Department of Justice then dispatched teams of
legal professionals throughout Iraq to further assess the needs of
199. See Dan E. Stigall, From Baton Rouge to Baghdad: A Comparative Overview of
the Iraqi Civil Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 131, 132 (2005) [hereinafter Stigall, From Baton
Rouge to Baghdad].
200. See Law No. 40 of 1951: The Civil Code, reprinted in BUSINESS LAWS OF IRAQ -
VOLUME III (Nicola H. Karam trans., 10th ed. 1990).
201. Civil Code art. 1, § 2 (Iraq).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Stigall, From Baton Rouge to Baghdad, supra note 199, at 132.
205. See Williamson, supra note 174, at 234-35.
206. Id. at 235.
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national courts so that resources could be allocated to respond to
other perceived shortcomings.2 7 The Coalition proceeded to
engage in a legal construction project that would see brilliant
successes accompanied by some miserable failures. A glimpse into
the Coalition's reconstructive efforts in areas of Iraqi criminal and
civil law reveals hits and misses that are instructive for those
seeking to engage in legal reconstruction in the future.
1. Reconstruction of Iraqi Criminal Law
As the Coalition engaged the local judiciary and assessed the
status of Iraqi courts, the CPA implemented CPA Memorandum
Number 7, which modified Iraq's penal code."' Among those
reforms were the suspension of capital punishment, torture, and
the institution of checks on certain articles of the penal code that
were used as tools of oppression by the Ba'athist regime, such as
the crime of insulting the president of Iraq and other political
crimes.2" These minor alterations did not fundamentally alter the
fabric of the criminal justice system in Iraq, but served to remove
its most unfair and oppressive elements. Such modifications,
though important, were minor as they did not disrupt the ordinary
functioning of the organic criminal justice system nor did they
change its basic design.
This approach to legal reconstruction -focusing allocation of
resources based on the needs of domestic courts while minimizing
modifications -is the best approach. The best way to determine
what needs to be fixed is to ask the lawyers and judges who work
within the walls of the domestic courts. By suspending the most
problematic and unfair provisions of the penal code, the justice
system could begin its work without a cloud of suspicion. By taking
this approach, the Coalition empowered the organic legal system.
However, not all of the CPA's reforms were so acceptable or well-
considered.
As noted above, Iraq's criminal justice system is based on the
French model."' Within two months, the Coalition implemented
CPA Memorandum Number 3, which modified Iraq's criminal
207. Id.
208. See L. Paul Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Memorandum No. 7, Penal Code (June 10, 2003) [hereinafter CPA Memo. No. 7].
209. Id. §§ 1-2.
210. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 58, at 358.
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procedure." John C. Williamson, who served as the Senior
Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice in Baghdad during the
initial phase of the occupation, noted:
[W]e provided certain protections for defendants that had been
absent in the Iraqi criminal justice system. Foremost among
these was the right to defense counsel from the outset of
judicial proceedings .... Arrested subjects were given the right
to remain silent in the face of questioning and a requirement
was instituted that they be advised of their rights when facing
criminal charges.12
In fact, CPA modifications granted Iraqis the absolute right to
remain silent beginning from the time they are arrested by any law
enforcement officer."3 CPA modifications also changed Iraqi law
so that no adverse inference can be drawn from the exercise of
that right.2 4
It is not quite accurate to say that such elements were
previously missing from the Iraqi criminal justice system. The Iraqi
Law on Criminal Proceeding forbids the use of torture 5 and states
that the examining magistrate or investigator is required to
question the accused within twenty-four hours of his arrival on the
scene and only after informing the accused of the crime of which
he is suspected. 6 Paragraph 126 already gave accused Iraqi
citizens the right to remain silent when being questioned by the
examining magistrate and indicated that, when being questioned,
the accused was not to be placed under oath.21 7 These laws had
already been in place but were merely ignored by the Ba'athist
regime.28
The CPA initiatives, however, required that a Miranda-like
warning be given to an accused Iraqi and that his silence could not
be used against him as it can be in the criminal law systems of
numerous Western democracies.1 9 In this regard, it is worth noting
that the CPA reforms gave greater protections to detained Iraqis
211. See L. Paul Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Memorandum No. 3, Criminal Procedures (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter CPA Memo. No.
3].
212. Williamson, supra note 174, at 239.
213. CPA Memo. No. 3, supra note 211, §§ 4, 6.
214. Id. § 4(c)(i).
215. Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 173, bk. 2, pt. 2, ch. 5, para. 127.
216. Id. para. 123.
217. Id. para. 126.
218. See Williamson, supra note 174, at 240.
219. Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 29:1
than those to which English and French citizens are entitled.220 This
level of protection was not previously available in Iraq because
such protections are not as emphasized in the inquisitorial system
221as they are in the adversarial system.
While the lack of an American-style privilege against self-
incrimination makes the Iraqi criminal system different from that
of its occupier, it does not make the system less sophisticated or
less humane. It is worth noting that a full privilege against self-
incrimination (as it is understood today) is a relatively recent
phenomenon in the Anglo-American criminal justice system,
arising only in the nineteenth century. The original intent of the
privilege, as embodied in the U.S. Constitution, was not to afford
criminal defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating
questions, but simply to prohibit improper methods of
interrogation, such as torture.2 3 Its current articulation seems to be
based largely on a historical misconception. Contemporary
220. See id. at 239.
221. See id.
222. See Henry E. Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its Nineteenth-Century Origins, in
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 145,
171 (1997) ("The development of the modern privilege against self-incrimination resulted
from developments made clear by R. v. Garbett, decided in 1847."). See also Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 181,197 (1997):
[T]he transformation of the privilege into a right of criminal defendants to
remain silent occurred only during the nineteenth century. Lawyerization of the
trial contributed to a changed ideology of criminal procedure - one in which the
dignity of the defendants lay not in their ability to tell stories fully but rather in
their ability to remain passive, to proclaim to the prosecutor, 'Thou sayest,' and
to force the state to shoulder the entire load. As defendants participated less in
the proceedings that determined their fate, they were seen more as objects or as
targets of the coercive forces of the state.
Id.
223. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 184-85
(1997).
224. More than the adaptation of old doctrines to new functions, the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination seems to reveal the tyranny of slogans.
Shorthand phrases have taken on lives of their own. These phrases have eclipsed
the goals of the doctrines that they purported to describe and even the texts that
embodied those doctrines.... They have drifted from condemning interrogation
under oath without evidentiary justification to condemning torture and all
interrogation of suspects under oath. The officials then have drifted to a
judgment that the framers of all the earlier doctrines unquestionably would have
disapproved: that it is unfair to expect defendants on trial and people arrested
on probable cause to participate actively in the criminal process by telling what
they know.
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scholars have questioned its logic even in the context of the
developed world:
The virtues of an "accusatorial" system in which defendants are
privileged to remain passive are far from obvious. The person
who knows the most about the guilt or innocence of a criminal
defendant is ordinarily the defendant himself. Unless expecting
him to respond to inquiry is immoral or inhuman (contrary to
Greenawalt's view of ordinary morality), renouncing all claim
to his evidence is costly and foolish. 25
Even if the goal of fortifying the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination is laudable and desirable in more stable
societies, it is questionable in the context of post-conflict
reconstruction. This is because, in such settings, there is a need for
security that unnecessarily strong protections tend to undermine
by increasing the difficulty of criminal prosecutions and evidence-
gathering. 6 The need for security and policy-implementation in
such a chaotic environment requires a more activist posture,
emphasizing the need for security and order in the nascent state
over the individual rights of its restless citizens. Further, historical
evidence tends to show that in certain circumstances, increased
prosecutorial burdens can lead to a reliance on the use of torture
to attain proof.2 The strong need to obtain evidence (or
Id. at 200-01 (internal citations omitted).
225. See id. at 183-84.
226. See generally Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Within C.LA., Growing Fears of
Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 1 (discussing how the C.I.A. has used "coercive
techniques" in interrogations).
227. Until the criminal ordinance of 1670, the absence of a complete proof in a
criminal case meant that, in theory, no conviction was possible and that, in
practice, no capital conviction was possible. As a result, whether confession was
understood to provide a complete or proximate proof, torture provided a central
position in the judicial system, providing capital convictions that would
otherwise have been unattainable.
See LISA SILVERMAN, TORTURED SUBJECTS: PAIN, TRUTH, AND THE BODY IN EARLY
MODERN FRANCE 44 (2001). See also JULIUS R. RUFF, VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 93 (2001):
Indeed, the law of proof in the Roman-canon tradition of jurisprudence was the
root of torture in our period. Proof of guilt for conviction in capital crimes had
to rest on either the testimony of two eye witnesses to the offense, or the
confession of the accused. Conviction was impossible without such proofs; the
law precluded courts from weighing circumstantial evidence and ruling on the
basis of such proof. Thus, when judges lacked two eyewitnesses to an offense,
but still possessed substantial proof of guilt, they required a confession to convict
the defendant.
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retribution) in post-conflict settings makes resorting to torture
even more seductive.2  Unfortunately, it seems that this is a reflex
from which neither occupiers nor the occupied are completely
immune.229
Obviously, there are a number of factors which lead to such
treatment which are completely divorced from the increased
burden in criminal prosecutions. However, faced with such
obstacles, the overwhelming need for control of unstable societies
in post-conflict situations (and the criminal element that persists
therein) may well result in the complete rejection of a legal
method deemed ineffective and the adoption of extralegal tactics
which are hoped to provide results. Likewise, the absence of an
effective criminal justice system in which wrongdoers actually
receive their just deserts might prompt others to take the law into
their own hands to carry out acts of retribution. This resort to
torture or other forms of violence as a means to an end is not
uncharacteristic of human behavior. As Nietzsche is quoted as
saying, "All morality is nothing more than an expression of
expediency."...
Given the fact that an American-style "full" privilege against
self-incrimination is not required in order to have a fair and
humane criminal justice system, is not considered a universal
human right, and is not a part of the organic Iraqi legal system, it
would have been best to refrain from this needless tinkering and
reserve to the nascent Iraqi judiciary the power to question the
suspected wrongdoer and draw adverse inferences from his or her
silence. Even if such powers are undesirable in the context of a
peaceful, developed society, the needs of a post-conflict society
and its strong governmental interest in containing chaos warrant
an approach that is less laissez-faire and more akin to Damagka's
Activist State and Policy-Implementing paradigm.
228. And with Iraq's legacy of brutal politics, limited oversight by the country's
weak courts, and general support of torture and execution by millions of Iraqis-
frustrated and angered by an insurgency that kills many more civilians than
soldiers-severe abuses were almost inevitable. The apparent pattern of torture
in Iraq also leaves the US in a political bind.
See generally Dan Murphy, Iraqi Torture Practices Could Be More Widespread:
Revelations this Week that Iraq's Interior Ministry Abused Detainees in a Secret Prison May
Be Just the Beginning, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2005, at 12.
229. See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S., Citing Abuse In Iraqi Prisons, Holds
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at 1; Jehl, supra note 226.
230. See DANIEL P. MANNIX, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE 13 (2003).
[Vol. 29:1
2007] "Organic Minimalist" Approach 35
It would have been far better to simply note the rights and
protections that Iraqi citizens did have under their system, when
properly functioning, and to focus on ensuring that those rights
and protections were actually provided. It would have been better
to limit the immediate goal of Iraqi legal reconstruction to
ensuring that the organic legal system functioned fairly and
properly. Different rights and different protections can gradually
be introduced as security in the post-conflict environment
improves and as (or if) the people of that society demand them.
When moving from tyranny to the protections offered by the
world's greatest democracy, it is sometimes best to take small
steps.
2. Reconstruction of Iraqi Civil Law
In all of its memoranda, regulations, and orders, the CPA
wisely left the Iraqi Civil Code largely untouched."' This was an
excellent decision as the Iraqi Civil Code is one of the best of its
kind in the Middle East and is more than adequate for the task of
regulating civil matters between Iraqi citizens.232 Rather than
engage in unnecessary tinkering with a cornerstone of Iraqi legal
culture, the CPA prioritized the needs of the judiciary and
allocated resources accordingly. In a short time, Ambassador L.
Paul Bremer, former director of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, was able to proclaim the results, noting as early as
October 9, 2003 that, "Six months ago there were no functioning
courts in Iraq. Today nearly all of Iraq's 400 courts are functioning.
Today, for the first time in over a generation, the Iraqi judiciary is
fully independent.
2 3
231. The Iraqi Civil Code, as amended, is still in force. The Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, the document
governing the Coalitional Provisional Government, provides that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this Law, the Laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall
remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional
Government in accordance with this Law." The Law of Administration for the
State of Iraq for the Transitional period, art. 26 (Mar. 8, 2004); E-mail from M.
Lawrence, Iraqi International Law Group, to Scott J. Borrowman (Dec. 11,
2004, 03:53 MST) (on file with author).
See Scott J. Borrowman, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib - Civil Remedies for
Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005
BYU L. REV. 371,422 n.310 (2005).
232. See Stigall, From Baton Rouge to Baghdad, supra note 199, at 152.
233. Bremer, supra note 169.
36 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 29:1
The coalition enjoyed successes in the reconstruction of Iraqi
civil law23 but it also made mistakes. One example was the creation
of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC). After the fall of
the Ba'athist regime, the coalition quickly realized that there were
a large number of displaced persons and land disputes that were
going to be a cause of ethnic tension."' There was a desire to ease
post-occupation instability and to quell violence caused by ethnic
tensions and an otherwise offended polity.36 However, rather than
simply empower the civil courts, where property disputes are
normally litigated, the decision was made to create a new
commission that would operate by its own rules rather than the
provisions of the Iraqi Civil Code. 7 On January 14, 2004, the CPA
promulgated a regulation to establish a commission "for the
purpose of collecting and resolving real property claims and to
promulgate procedures for promptly resolving such claims in a fair
and judicious manner." '38 A new entity, therefore, was to be
created to govern a set of problems for which an organic entity
already existed.
The results of this endeavor were predictable. The IPCC had
enormous difficulty starting its work and its rules and procedures
were poorly drafted, with critical gaps and glaring omissions."
However, its failings were not merely in the inadequacy of its
substantive rules, but also in its ability to operate.2 4 ' By September
2004, months after the dissolution of the CPA, the situation had
not improved."' Agence-France Press reported: "Iraq's property
claims commission for disputed land in oil-rich northern Iraq has
234. See generally Stigall, From Baton Rouge to Baghdad, supra note 199, at 132
(explaining that the Iraqi Civil Code retains a great deal of the structure of a traditional
civil law jurisdiction, thereby retaining the advantage of being connected with a majority
of the world's legal traditions and centuries of legal development).
235. See generally L. Paul Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority
Regulation No. 8, Delegation of Authority Regarding an Iraq Property Claims
Commission, (Jan. 14, 2004) [hereinafter CPA Reg. No. 8] ("[L]arge numbers of people
from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in Iraq have been uprooted and forced to




239. Stigall, Courts, Confidence, and Claims Commissions, supra note 170, at 34.
240. Id.
241. See Jennie Matthew, Iraqi Property Commission Failing, 167,400 Displaced




failed to process a single claim, despite more than 167,400 Kurds
re-settling in dozens of refugee camps since March alone.
242
Another unfortunate side-effect of the IPCC's creation was
that Iraqi Civil Courts were deprived of an enormous part of their
natural jurisdiction and, perhaps, their best chance in the
aftermath of the war to show that they were a neutral, effective,
and legitimate institution that can be a force for good in Iraqi
society. The coalition made the same mistake in Iraq as NGOs did
in Afghanistan by failing to see that the provision of basic services
is the role of government and, when the government looks
incapable of doing its job, governmental legitimacy is
undermined . 3
Though it did eventually begin to adjudicate property claims,
the legitimacy deficit encountered by this entity was too great to
overcome. In late December 2005, the New York Times reported
that displaced Iraqi Kurds were not seeking recourse in the Iraqi
Property Claims Commission, but had instead started taking
matters into their own hands.2" Thus, the ill-fated IPCC led to a
breakdown in civil order and undermined faith in governmental
institutions. Its failure was an expensive one.245
In March 2006, a new law came into force, replacing the IPCC
with a new entity called the Commission for Resolution of Real
Property Disputes (CRRPD).2' The better course of action would
have been to remit the tasks and jurisdiction of the IPCC to the
Iraqi civil courts. Instead, once again, rather than empower
organic institutions, the decision was made to create yet another
bureaucracy. This new entity, the CRRPD, is to operate according
to new regulations and procedures which are still being drafted as
of the time of the writing of this article. 7 Preliminary indications,
242. See id.
243. See Starr, supra note 166, at 117.
244. See Wong, supra note 170.
245. See Human Rights Watch, Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in
Northern Iraq, at 70, HRW Index No. E1604, Aug. 3, 2004 [hereinafter Claims in Conflict]
("[T]he Iraq Supplemental bill approved by the U.S. Congress for the post-war
reconstruction program provided for $35 million for property-related compensation
claims, of which $5 million was earmarked for administration costs.").
246. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Iraq: Sectarian Violence, Military
Operations Spark New Displacement, as Humanitarian Access Deteriorates, May 23, 2006,
available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/
(httplnfoFiles)/5FF5134F8672E698C125717700492CAC/$file/Iraq%200verview%2023%2
OMay%202006.pdf [hereinafter Iraq: Sectarian Violence].
247. See generally Int'l Org. for Migration, Ongoing Improvements for the Iraqi
Property Claims Process, at 7, Mar.-Apr. 2006, http://www.iom-iraq.net/newsletters/
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however, are that certain changes will be made, such as including
new provisions allowing "good faith secondary occupants a right to
compensation from the government if the property they currently
live in is restituted to the original owner."2 . Further,
''compensation amounts will now be calculated with reference to
the value of the property on the date on which the claim was filed
rather than the date of the wrongful taking by the former regime, a
change which will often result in higher levels of compensation.
'2
11
Most promisingly, there are some indications that the new rules
will at least reference the Iraqi Civil Code -which is a small step in
the right direction.25 ° It is hoped that this new bureaucracy will
avoid the fate of the IPCC by striving to operate in accordance
with the legal regime already in place and working closely with
local courts to provide redress.
The scuttling of the IPCC demonstrates the enormous waste
of time and money that can result when sufficient attention is not
given to organic legal systems. Two years of valuable time and
resources were wasted.25' The errors of the IPCC demonstrate the
value of the organic minimalist approach to legal reconstruction.
By simply studying Iraqi civil law, recognizing the law's ability to
properly address property disputes, and empowering civil courts,
IOMIraq-Newsletter marApr06_- English.pdf [hereinafter Ongoing Improvements] ("In
the months of March and April, IOM shared with the CRRPD a list of proposed laws,
regulations and guidelines for the CRRPD's consideration in implementation of the new
statute which governs the Commissions work. In addition, the claims application
procedure has changed, requiring updating of information and training for staff.").
248. See Iraq: Sectarian Violence, supra note 246, at 16.
249. See id.
250. The new organization's website references Iraqi Civil Code articles when defining
and explaining property and property rights. See Commission for Resolution of Real
Property Disputes (CRRPD), Introduction, www.crrpd.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
251. One principal concern with the commission has been the delays in provision
of compensation. As of 30 April 2006, the commission had received over 132,000
claims and adjudicated on fewer than 22,000 (IOM, 17 May 2006). Some
compensation has been paid, yet delays are reported in payments and the
amounts are insufficient (UNAMI, 29 March 2006; IRIN, 24 May 2005; BBC, 25
April 2005). The commission has faced challenges in carrying out its mandate,
including technical and operational obstacles, and threats of violence. In central
and northern Iraq, local authorities have in some cases bypassed the commission
and allocated land to returnees, but because this has been done on an ad hoc
basis there is concern that it could create further tensions and problems in the
restitution of property and land to displaced people (IOM/UNOPS, September
2005).
See Iraq: Sectarian Violence, supra note 246.
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millions of dollars and an immeasurable wealth of legitimacy could
have been saved.
X. WITHIN THE MINIMALIST CONTEXT, FINDING THE RIGHT
PERSON FOR THE JOB
No discussion of legal reconstruction would be complete
without at least some discussion of which entity is best suited for
the task. The task of rebuilding broken states is vastly complex and
is best accomplished by a plurality of actors working in concert. In
the early days of development, this was the way in which nation-
building was conducted.252 However, in spite of the continued
importance of non-state actors such as NGOs and volunteer
organizations, recent events in Iraq have demonstrated that such
broad participation is not necessarily guaranteed.2 3 Further, as
discussed above, an abundance of uncontrolled participants can
have adverse consequences such as undermining governmental
legitimacy and creating a greater perception of occupation."'
In the burgeoning literature regarding state-building in
weakened states, there is a trend for commentators to lament the
increasingly important role of the military in reconstruction and
252. After World War II, nation-building was not performed solely through
government action but also through- the use of the abilities of NGOs and
international institutions. From the 1940s on, the U.S. government understood
that private and international bodies, and particularly private voluntary
organizations, have the knowledge, resources, and commitment to carry out
many tasks that are vital to all stages of nation-building.
See generally Ekbladh, supra note 5, at 36.
253. The ready return of the term nation-building to the international lexicon
following wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is a sign of the concept's endurance.
However, its reappearance has not meant a reconstruction of the structures,
assumptions, and relationships that drove nation-building efforts during the
Cold War. In part, this failure is a reflection of the development community's
continuing wariness of large-scale programs. In the struggle by the United States
to build a new and viable state in Iraq after the demolition of the Hussein regime
in 2003, many specialists and policymakers maintain an overt hostility to the idea
of state planning and control. Even among recent converts to nation-building in
the Bush administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority, reflexive
references remained for the need for privatization in the reconstruction. A blunt
American policy in Iraq has also served to alienate many nonstate institutions
whose forerunners were regular participants during the Cold War. As a result,
capable organizations have given Iraq a wide berth. Although private
contractors have been quick to jump into the Iraq project, they represent only
one side of the diverse selection of institutions involved in nation-building's
earlier variations.
See generally id.
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development.255 In Time magazine, Joe Klein proposed a different
approach to post-conflict reconstruction by creating an alternative
to the military: "Call them Extreme Peacekeepers of the Freedom
Corps or whatever, but seek out the sort of people who aren't
normally inclined to join the military-idealistic young college
students who hope to become doctors, lawyers, politicians or
engineers and are eager to do something noble (and burnish their
r6sum6s) by serving their country. ' , 211 Such an argument not only
ignores the necessity of military forces in most state-building
efforts, but also neglects the reality of the modern military and the
personnel deployed into hostile environments in support of
military missions.
Military assets are the preferred choice for the task of state-
building for many reasons. One reason is that their presence is a
generally indispensable element of any state-building operation.
After several decades of mixed results in such endeavors,
commentators now note that state-building generally requires the
presence of military forces to provide security and perform
essential administrative functions.2 7 Another reason that military
personnel are the preferred choice for the task is the modern
military's diverse and robust contingent of professionals. The
armed forces of the United States regularly deploy, not only with
skilled infantrymen and other "combat arms" soldiers, but with a
host of trained professionals such as physicians, lawyers (Judge
Advocates), and engineers-all of whom are uniformed service
members. These trained professionals bring their unique talents
and capabilities with the deployed force to enrich its capabilities
and service the needs of commanders and troops. Specifically in
the legal realm, the armed forces possess a corps of educated,
255. See BAli, supra note 18, at 438 ("Prevailing in a military battle against a weak state
with limited defensive capacities is scarcely a qualification for the job of nation-
building.").
256. Joe Klein, It's Time for Extreme Peace Keeping, TIME, Nov. 24,2003, at 25.
257. The deployment of large numbers of U.S. ground troops is the second
criterion of nation building. As the case of Guatemala in 1954 demonstrates, a
regime change may occasionally be accomplished without the deployment of
U.S. military forces. But nation-building generally requires the tong-term
commitment of ground forces, which are used either to depose the regime
targeted by the United States or to maintain a regime that it favors. In many
cases, U.S. ground troops are needed not only to fight hostile forces in target
countries, but also to perform essential administrative functions, such as
establishing law and order.
See, e.g., Pei et al, supra note 25, at 65.
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trained, and skilled attorneys who regularly practice law within the
United States and abroad."' These Judge Advocates are also
trained soldiers who deploy and operate in difficult and hostile
environments."i They are able to operate in post-conflict states
and assist in rebuilding or developing legal infrastructure. A
review of recent state-building endeavors proves their worth and
efficacy."
Delegating the primary responsibility of legal reconstruction
to the Judge Advocates, whose presence is already required in
post-conflict settings, economizes the assets already in use while
achieving a unity of command which is unattainable with
nongovernmental entities. Thus, they are not only suitable for the
job of legal reconstruction, but they are, in many ways, ideal.
XI. CONCLUSION
Since September 11, 2001, and the realization that weakened
states can serve to incubate terrorist organizations, the star of
state-building has been in the ascendant. Once scorned, the costly
practice of rebuilding underdeveloped countries has resurfaced as
an important part of the effort to eradicate terrorism and to ensure
the continued security of Western democracies. The United States,
in particular, has recently undertaken massive state-building
projects in Afghanistan and Iraq and it is foreseeable that there
will be more to come as new terrorist organizations emerge and
old ones flee to environments more conducive to their aims. Legal
reconstruction in such weakened states is critical to establishing
258. See generally FREDERIC BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT: ARMY
LAWYERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI (2001).
259. Versatility of the [JAG] Corps' personnel enhances the versatility afforded
by the [JAG] Corps to the Army. As operations are increasingly executed by
joint and interagency task forces and, in combined environments, judge
advocates are likely to deploy as part of a composite legal support section.
Because of the composite, complex nature of modern operations, judge
advocates supporting combat support or combat service support units may be as
likely to deploy as those assigned to combat units. Such was the case in Haiti,
Somalia, and Rwanda. Soldier-lawyers must be physically fit and mentally
prepared to deploy whether they are assigned to the Pentagon or to a division.
See Marc L. Warren, Operational Law-A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 33, 38
(1996).
260. See, e.g., Richard Whitaker, Legal Operations in Northern Iraq: The 101st
Airborne Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 13 THE PUBLIC LAWYER 10, 15
(2005) ("By the time the 101l' Airborne Division returned to the United States in February
of 2004, over 40 civil and criminal courts were open in AO North and hearing upward of
50 cases each day.").
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post-conflict security and essential government functions. Given
the heavy cost of such operations-a cost measured in blood as
much as treasure-it is imperative that those seeking to rebuild
weakened states establish order and effective institutions quickly,
efficiently, and enduringly.
The organic minimalist approach to legal reconstruction
counsels that those seeking to effect lasting and effective legal
reconstruction of weakened states concentrate on empowering
organic legal institutions through a focused, intelligent allocation
of resources based on an understanding of the target nation's legal
tradition. Therefore, such operations should begin with a thorough
study of that nation's legal system so that proper legal choices can
be made and disruption (or disaster) can be averted. Rather than
attempt to recast the target legal system in the occupier's own
image, the legal system of the target nation should be allowed to
function in its intended manner. Redundant bureaucracy-building
and paternalistic practices that foster dependency should be
eschewed. The tasks involved with legal reconstruction should be
carried out by those whose presence is already required, thus
minimizing the footprint of the occupier. An analysis of legal
reconstruction efforts in Iraq shows the Coalition's greatest
successes were achieved when adhering to these precepts.
The aim of organic minimalism is not drastic reform but,
rather, accelerated rehabilitation and institutionalization. Its desire
is not to change the face of a nation's legal system, but only to help
it to its feet so that it again functions in its intended manner.
Solutions to legal problems, therefore, should not be reflexively
found in the repertoire of a familiar legal system, but in the ecole
de vgritg of comparative law. Only through such an approach can
state-building ever function as an effective and sustainable strategy
in the war on terror. As Francis Fukuyama has noted, "[I]t is only
the ability to create and maintain self-sustaining indigenous
institutions that permits outside powers to formulate an exit
strategy......
261. Fukuyama, Guidelines, supra note 22, at 6-7.
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